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FINANCING THEORIES AND FINANCING PRACTICES: A CASE
STUDY OF TWO CASINO COMPANIES
Zheng Gu
and
JolanKu
ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the financing behaviors of two major casino companies,
Mirage Resorts, Inc., and Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., in their recent expansion
projects. It compares the two companies' financingpractices with the three existing
financing theories, namely the traditional trade-off theory, the pure pecking order
theory, and the modified pecking order theory. It appears that the modified pecking
order theory can best describe the two companies' financingbehaviors.

Introduction
In corporate finance, what determines the corporate capital structure decision, or the
decision about the mix of financing sources, remains an issue without a consensus. Myers
(1984)examined the two existingtheories about corporate financing, the traditional tradeoff (TTO) theory and the pure pecking order (PPO) theory. Myers found that both failed
to explain corporate financing behavior satisfactorily Attempting to solve the capital
structure puzzle, Myers proposed what he termed "the modified pecking order" (MPO)
financingtheory.Therefore, there are at least three theories explaining corporate financing
behavior.
Andrew and Schmidgall(1993)have pointed out that the two areas of financial management that concern hospitality managers most are the investment decision and the financing or capital structure decision. Capital structure has a direct impact on the cost of
capital and hence on the value of the firm. In hospitality research, nonetheless, capital
stkcture has been insufficiently covered. The studies on hotel capital structure determinants by Kwansa, Johnson, and Olsen (1987) and Sheel (1994); the research on restaurant
debt financing by Gu (1993);and a comparison of the capital structure of the hotel industry
with those of three slow-growingindustries by Gu (1996) are the few documented studies
in the area.
The rapid expansion of the gaming industry in recent years has made casino financing
mix or capital structure an issue of growing importance. There is, however, a lack of academic studies on the capital structure of casino firms. This paper analyzes the financing
practices of two major casino companies, Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and Mirage Resorts, Inc., in their recent expansion projects. Comparing the two companies' financing behaviors with the three existing financingtheories, the study attempts to idenbfy the theory
that can best describe casino financingbehavior in reality. The two expansion projects analyzed in this study are the two newly constructed casino megaresorts, Luxor" of Circus
"
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Circus and "Treasure Island" of Mirage. Both are located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and were
launched into operation in December 1993.
Financing theory is a positive theory that explains how a firm's financing policy is determined. It is not a normative theory that would advise what a firm's financing policy
should be. The study is not designed to provide any policy guideline for casino firms. The
study attempts to find, among the three existing financing theories, the theory that can best
explain corporate financing behavior in practice. The purpose of the study is to help hospitality educatorsand researchersbetter understand casino firms' financing decision making. Many casino expansion projects have been completed during the recent gamingboom,
providing us with good examples of casino financing. Comparing the financing theories
with actual corporate financing behaviors, the study can provide real-world evidence for
the theories.
Review of the Three Financing Theories

The capital structure irrelevance theory proposed by Modighani and Miller (1963)
holds that a firm's value is not affected by its capital structure. The theory, however, was
proposed under some strid assumptions, such as frictionless markets, no tax, no bankruptcy costs, and no growth. On the other hand, the 'IT0 theory of capital structure recognizes taxes and bankruptcies. The essence of the TTO is that a firm's debt-equity decision is
based on the trade-off between the debt's tax shield and the costs associated with bankruptcy and financial distress (Robichek& Myers, 1966;Marsh, 1982).According to the 'ITO,
the firm sets an optimal target debt-to-equity ratio at which the marginal costs and marginal benefits of debt exactly offset each other. The firm will gradually move toward the
target ratio. Typically, the target debt-equity ratio varies across firms. Companies with
plenty of taxable income to shield tend to have high debt-equity ratios. Unprofitable companies may want to rely more on equity financing. Empirical studies attempting to find the
determinantsof capital structure within the trade-off frameworkindude those by Fem and
Jones (1979), March (1982), and Castanias (1983).Bradley et al. (1984)provided an overall
review of the 'IT0 theory and empirical studies. The problem with the TTO theory, as Brealey and Myers (1984)pointed out, is that the theory cannot explain the real-life capital structure phenomenon that the most profitable companies generally thrive with little debt.
Donaldson (1961& 1969)discussed the principles of the PPO financing theory. The essence of the theory is that a firm follows a pecking-order of preference when making decisions on sources of capital. According to the PPO, internally generated funds are the most
preferred, followed by debt if external financing is required. New equity is the last source
for financing consideration. There is no well-defined target debt-equity ratio in the PPO. A
firm's preference for internal financing, as Donaldson pointed out (1961),is due to its management's unwillingness to be subjectedto market scrutinywhen raising funds on the capital market. Donaldson (1961)observed that managers stronglyfavored internal generation
as a source of new funds even to the exclusion of external funds, except for occasional
unfavorable 'bulges' in the need for funds. He pointed out that if external financing was
needed, managers rarely thought of issuing common stocks. Baskin (1989)tested the PPO
by analyzing the debt ratios of sample firms and their relationship to past profitability. His
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results supported the hypothesis that firms with higher past profitability use less debt
financing.
Myers (1984) modified the PPO theory and proposed what he called "the Modified
Pecking Order" financing theory. In the MPO, the preference order of financing sources is
the same as in the PPO, except that safe debt is preferred to risky debt. The MPO theory
differs from the PPO theory on two major issues. First, the MPO suggests that information
asymmetry, rather than the management's unwillingness to accept market scrutiny, determines managers' preference for internal financing. Information asymmetry refers to the
market's lack of understanding of the true value of a firm's investment opportunitieswhen
the i k n issues new securities to financeinvestment projects (Myersand Majluf, 1984).The
consequence is the undervaluation of the security and therefore the undervaluation of the
firm.The likelihood of undervaluation is related to the riskiness of the security to be issued. The riskier the security, the more likely it is that the market will undervalue the firm.
While using internally generated funds can enable a firm to avoid such undervaluation,
issuing less risky securities can reduce the undervaluation. As common stock is the most
risky security for outside investors, new stock issuanceis most likely to cause undervaluation. Therefore, in the MPO, internally generated funds are the most preferred, followed by
safe debt, risky debt, and finally new equity.
Second, the preference of debt to equity in the MPO theory is reversible. The MPO emphasizes not only information asymmetry but also a firm's preference for "financial slack
or debt capacity. The firm may reverse the order when its preference for reserving borrowing capacity prevails. Therefore, the firm may move back on the preference order and issue
new equity, instead of debt, to maintain or increase financial slack.
In an empirical study, Gu (1996) compared the capital structure of the hotel industry
with those of three slow-growingindustries:the petroleum and coal products industry, the
apparel and textile industry, and the fabricated material products industry. Different leverage ratios were used for the comparison. The results supported the MPO theory.

Operating Features of Casino Firms
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The entertainment nature of the casino industry may make the revenues of casino hotels more volatile than those of regular hotels. The casino industry relies more on people's
discretionary income than the hotel industry, which caters to a mix of business and pleasure travelers. A negative economic event, such as high inflation that reduces people's real
income, may inflict a greater impact on casino revenues. The higher risk of the casino industry was evidenced by its greater beta. According to the financial database of Prodigy
(1994),at the end of 1994, the average beta of the casino industry was 1.22, compared with
the hotel industry's average of 0.79. In the meantime, the casino industry was less leveraged, with an average debt to equity ratio of 0.88, compared with the hotel industry's 1.45.
Obviously, the casino industry's greater covariance with the capital market was mainly
due to its operational features, rather than its financing features.

r

The products of the casino industry are risky games. Within the casino industry, casinos offering high-limit games may have more volatile revenues than those offering only
t
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low-limit games because of windfall wins and losses. MGM Grand, Inc., which owns and
operates MGM Casino in Las Vegas, had an operating loss in the second quarter of 1995,
partly due to a one-night blackjack loss of $20 million to Keny Packer, an Australian high
roller (MGM Grand, Inc., 1995). Caesars World, Inc., which operated Caesars Palace,
another giant casino resort featuring high-limit games in Las Vegas, had negative earnings
in summer 1994because of big losses to Asian high rollers (Caesars World, Inc., 1994).
The operation features of casinos imply that the operating cash flows (OCF)of casino
firms, and those of high-limit casinos in particular, may be less stable in comparison with
those of regular hotel firms.Therefore, a casino firm has to be very cautious if it decides to
finance an expansion project with its OCF. A casino firm catering to high rollers is less
likely to rely on internally generated cash flow to finance expansion than a casino featuring
low-limit games.

The Financing of Circus Circus' "Luxor" Casino ~ o t e l l
The "Luxor" project of Circus Circus, Inc., a casino company whose casinos typically
cater to low-wager gamblers, is a 30-story pyramid-shaped casino hotel with 2,500 rooms.
The construction cost was estimated at $300 million. The project was announced in November 1991and was started in early 1992.By the end of 1991,prior to the construction, the
company had the following financing options for the project.
First, the company could use its internally generated 0 0 .The company had paid no dividend in the past. All the earnings had been retained for intemal-financing.Its OCF in 1991,
calculated as its net income plus depreciation and amortization, totaled $151.12 million
The company's earnings and OCF in the previous years (1981-1991) demonstrated a
pattern of steady increase (see Table I),except for a slight dip in EPS in 1986. Its OCF had
grown at an average annual rate of 21.7%in the previous 11years. The steady growth of the
earnings and OCF of Circus Circus, Inc., could be partly attributed to the low-limit operation policy of the company. The stable and increasing OCF of the company could be a reliable internal financing source for the "Luxor" project.
The company projected that the monthly OCF duringthe 1992-1993period from existing properties would be $10 million to $12 million. In other words, a total of $240 million to
$288 million of OCF was expected to be generated for the two-year period. The "Luxor"
project was scheduled to be completed in two years. The company's expected internal OCF
would be able to cover almost the entire project's costs, $300 millon.

l~inancial
information was obtained from the Annual Reports (1991-1994)of Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc., Value Line, and interviews with the company's officials in charge of investors
relations.
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Second, new common equity could be a source of financing. The company had 62.5
million shares of common stocks outstanding, with 150million shares authorized. It could
issue more common shares. Prior to the announcement of the "Lwor" project, the company was a favored stock on the market, traded at a price/earning (PE) ratio around 26,
well above the S&P500s average PE of 19. The market condition was favorable.
Third, the company had two existinglong-term notes. At the end of 1991, its long-term
debt to total capitalization ratio (LTDTC) at book value was 50.87%,which compared favorably with the industry's average of 65.84%.With its debt capacity greater than the average of the industry, the company could issue new long-term debt to finance the project. Additionally, the company had a total of $500 million of bank revolvers, of which the company
had used only $247 million. A credit line of $253 million was still available. The large
amount of bank credit available to Circus Circus, Inc., was backed up by the company's
excellent past and expected future cash flow. According to Fogarty and KiLlian (1990),onehalf of the major insurance companies, banks, and commercial credit companies simply
did not accept applications for financing new lodging properties during the 1990-1991 recession. However, should a loan be committed for an expansion project, the project must be
supported by the ability to generate healthy cash flow.
The company's decision on financing the project was to rely on internally generated
cash flow. It also decided that in case of fund shortage, bank revolvers, which are shorter
but less risky than long-term notes, should be used. The company decided not to issue new
debt or equity for the "Luxor" project. As scheduled, the "Luxor" casino hotel was completed and had its grand opening in late 1993.The actual expenditure was in line with the
initial estimate. No additional external funds were raised for the project. In 1993, during
the construction of another project, "Grand Slam Canyon," the company issued $150 million senior subordinatedlong-term notes, followed by another issue of $150 million debentures. Bothissues were for financing needs not related to the "Lwor" project. The company
successfully financed the construction of "Luxor" with internally generated funds.

The Financing of Mirage's "Treasure Island project2
The "Treasure Island" of Mirage Resorts, Inc., a casino company whose casinos are featured with high-limit games, is a 3,000-room pirate-themed casino hotel. The construction
of "Treasure Island" had its debut at the beginning of 1992and was completed in December
1993. The total cost was initially estimated at $430 million. At the end of 1991, prior to the
construction, the company had the following financing options.
First, Mirage could use its internal OCF as a part of the financingfor "Treasure Island."
Table 1shows its earnings and OCF from 1981through 1993.The company's operation was

2~inancialinformation was obtained from Mirage Resorts, Inc.' s Annual Reports
(1991-1994), Value Line, and interviews with officials in charge of investors relations.
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very profitable in 1991, generating $106.14 million of OCF. The company expected to generate
a similar amount of OCF in 1992 and 1993, about $100 million per year. Since the project was
planned to be completed in two years, internal cash flow would be well below the estimated
capital requirement of $430 million. Besides, unlike Grcus Circus, Mirage's eamings and OCF
had been unstable in the past (see Table 1).During the 11-year period 1981-1991, it experienced four inmases and six demases in annual OCF. In 1989, it had a negative cash flow of
$5.38 million The high volatility of the W s OCF implied that internal funds would be m liable financing soumes for the project. In comparison with Cixus Cixus, Mirage's future
OCF could .be instable and insufficient. External financing was needed.
Second, Mirage could also issue new equity to finance the project. The company had
authorized 225 million common shares, with only 47 million shares outstanding. By the
end of 1991, Mirage's stock was traded around a PE of 40, even "hotter" than the stock
of Circus Circus, Inc. The company could raise new equity in a favorable capital market
environment.
Third, Mirage, Inc., had signhcantly improved its debt capacity through its mid-1991
debt restructuring. Issuing new long-term debt was another financing option. The company's LTDTC was 89.2%at the end of 1990 (see Table 2), which compared unfavorably with
the industry's average of 72.35%.In mid-1991, prior to the announcement of the construetion of "Treasure Island," the company made two new public offerings of common stocks
to bring down its extremely high leverage ratio. The company's LTDTC thus decreased to
72.63%by the end of 1991, compared with the industry's average of 65.84%.The company's financial slack, though still below the industry's average, had been improved.
The company's decision was to issue $300 million first mortgage notes as its primary
method of financingthe "Treasure Island" project. Internal OCF, estimated at $200 million
for the 19921993period, would play a less important role. The notes were collateralized
with its three existing casino properties. The new debt was issued in 1992. As scheduled,
the "Treasure Island" casino was completedin late 1993.The actual construction cost of the
project was $470 million, $40 million higher than the original estimate. The OCF generated
from existing operations in 1992 and 1993 totaled $222.1 million. The $300 million raised
t h r o u g h i s s ~ n o t e scombined
,
with the internal OCF, shouldbe sufficient for the project.
In November 1993, due to the financing needs for improvements of three existing casinos,
the company raised another $170 million through public offering of common stbcks.
A Comparison: Financing Theories Versus the Two Firms' Practices

Before the two companies embarked on their new expansion projects in early 1992,
their OCFs in the two previous years improved sigruficantly while at the same time, their
leverage ratios dropped. Table 2 shows that the OCFs of the two companies increased
while their LTDTC ratios decreased from 1990 to 1992. According to the TTO theory, unprofitable companies would rely more on equity financing, whereas profitable companies
may want to have higher leverage to shield taxable income. The fact that the two companies' debt leverage ratios declined as they became more profitable in terrns of OCF contradicts the TTO theory. In a longer time frame of 1981-1993, the coefficient of correlation
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between OCF and LTDTC was calculated and tested for the two companies respectively.
The coefficient of correlation of Circus Circuswas -0.16 with a P value of 0.60 and that of the
Mirage was 4.41 with a P value of 0.17. The test of the correlation did not support a positive relationship between profitability and use of debt either. The evidence from the two
casino companies' financing practices confirmed Brealey and Myers' (1984) conclusion
that the TTO theory fails to explain the real-life corporate financing behavior -profitable
companies are often found to use less debt.
In financingits "Luxor" project, Circus Circus, Inc., had a dear preference for its internal cash flow, followed by external bank credit revolvers, which was shorter and less risky
than long-term notes. New equity was not planned, nor was it issued later. In fact, issuance
of new equity had not been considered by Circus Circus as a financing means for years.
Relatively risky long-term notes, $150 million senior subordinated notes and $150 million
debentures, were issued later in 1993. Both were for other financing needs.
On the other hand, without stable and sufficient expected cash flow, Mirage, Inc., had
to rely on external financing as its main financing source for "Treasure Island." The management chose to use secured first mortgage notes, instead of new common equity, for the
project. The company did issue new common stocks in early 1991and late 1993. While the
1991issuance was entirely meant for debt restructuring prior to the announcement of the
"Treasure Island" project, the 1993issuance served two purposes: financing the improvements of existing properties and further improving the debt capacity.
The two companies' financing decisions showed a dear financing pattern in which internal funds were given the priority, followed by debts, such as bank revolvers, mortgage
notes, and unsecured debentures. New equity was not issued for the projects. The financing preference orders of the two companies seemed consistent with what is described by
the PPO and MPO theories.
In terms of debt financing both companies used safe debt first, which was consistent
with the MPO theory. While Circus Circus considered bank revolvers in the first place and
used risky notes and debentures later on for an unrelated project, Mirage issued only secured long-term mortgage notes for the project. The two companies' preference of lessrisky debt to risky debt was obvious and was consistent with the MPO theory.
Both companies showed their desire for maintaining or improving financial slack in
their finanang behaviors. Circus Circus, Inc., had intended to keep the debt-to-capital ratio low and maintain a healthy financial position. Reserving debt capacity had been a
dearly stated corporate policy. In the company's Annual Report (1991),the management
indicated that "By design, Circus Circus is well-positioned at the low end of the industry
leverage scale, keeping plenty of investment capacity in reserve." The sharp decline in the
LTDTC of Mirage in recent years (see Table 2) was indicative of its pursuance of financial
slack. The company's 1991 stock issuance, plus the retained earnings generated from its
profitable 1991 operation, lowered the LTDTC ratio from 1990's 89.2% to 1991's 72.63%.
After its new public offering of stocks in late 1993, Mirage's LTDTC further dropped to
37%.The company's public offerings of stocks in 1991and 1993seemed consistent with the
MPO's hypothesis that the preference for new debt to new equity can be reversed when the
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desire for financial slack dominates. The fact that both companies pursued financial slack
and Mirage moved back on the preference order to achieve greater debt capacity supported the MPO theory.
The two companies' avoidance of using new equity to finance the projects was likely
due to possible market undervaluation. According to Ehlers (1996),there was a generalbelief on Wall Street during the gaming expansion that the Las Vegas Market was saturated.
When "The Mirage," Mirage Resorts, Inc.'s first megaresort on the Las Vegas Strip, was
opened in late 1989, the consensus held that the visitor base was not large enough to support a new megaresort. The same belief prevailed on Wall Street when the two companies
announced their plans for the new projects. The two companies' avoidance of new equity
financing for the projects seemed to fit the information asymmetry hypothesis of the MPO
theory. Using internal OCF, Circus Circus could avoid possible undervaluation caused by
Using secured mortgage notes could enable Mirage to reduce
the information asymmet~.
such undervaluation.
Mirage actually adopted a two-step strategy in financing "Treasure Island." Its first
step was to issue new common equity to retire debt in early 1991. The second step was to
issue new debt during the construction of the project. The earnings and OCF of the company had been instable in the past (see Table 1). If common stocks had been issued to finance the project in the first place, the security might have been well undervalued because
of the risks involved for potential investors. The secured long-term notes, though not riskfree, were much safer for investors.The undervaluation associated with the issuance of the
notes, if any, should be less than that associatedwith a new issuance of common stocks. The
informationasymmetry hypothesis seems to provide a reasonable explanationfor Mirage,
Inc.'s strategy.

Conclusions
The two casino companies' financing practices in their new expansion projects do not
support the TTO theory. The PPO and MPO theories seem to describe the financing behaviors of the two casino companies better than the TTO theory. There was an obvious preference order in the two companies' financing decisions of their expansion projects. Between
the PPO and MPO theories, the evidence leaned toward the latter.
It is inappropriate to generalize the findings from the two casino companies to the casino industry as a whole. As the two firms analyzed in the study are two of the largest casino companies, it is appropriate to conclude that large casino companies do have a preference order in financing their investment projects as suggested by the MPO theory. In
financing a project, internally generated OCF is the most favored, followed by safe debt
and then risky debt. New common equity is the least preferred, but can be used to achieve
financial slack or to increase debt capacity for future debt financing.
Financing decisions are critical to the cost of capital of the hospitality industry and the
value of the hospitality firm. Capital structure should be an important topic in the research
and education of hospitality finance. It certainly deserves more academic attention. Gu's
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(1996) study found evidence supportive of the MPO theory from the hotel sector. This
study has provided additional evidence for the MPO from large casino companies' financing practices. However, it is still too early to conclude that the MPO is the theory that can
best describe financing behavior in the entire hospitality industry. Future studies may
compare the three financing theories with financing behaviors of small casino firms. Furthermore, empirical studies on the financing behavior in the restaurant industry in comparison with the three existing theories are also needed.
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Table 1
Earnings and Operating Cash Flows of the Two Companies
(1981-1993)
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Note:

Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.
OCF(Mi1.)
EPS
OCFPS
$22.27
$0.16
$0.23
0.19
0.28
27.11
0.23
0.31
34.77
0.28
0.42
47.10
0.33
0.49
55.25
0.32
0.54
61.16
0.55
0.80
90.98
1.15
104.11
0.76
1.24
106.14
0.87
1.51
124.53
1.02
1.78
151.12
1.23
167.60
1.41
1.92
1.34
2.02
174.30
EPS = Earnings per share.
OCF = Operating cash flow.
OCFPS = Operating cash flow per share.

Source:Value Line, August 30,1996.

Mirage Resorts, Inc.
EPS
OCFPS
OCF(Mi1.)
$0.15
$0.21
$41.48
0.14
0.24
41.08
0.22
0.33
59.20
0.05
0.17
29.25
0.13
49.17
0.32 .
0.02
0.18
31.01
0.03
0.21
23.56
-0.02
0.15
13.11
-0.33
-0.06
-5.38
0.31
1.OO
83.46
0.40
0.95
104.36
0.26
0.67
99.90
0.29
0.67
122.20
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Table 2
Operating Cash Flow and Long-Term Debt to Total Capitalization
of the Two Companies (1981-1993)
Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.

-

-

Note:

Mirage Resorts, Inc.

-

-

OCF = Operating cash flow.
LTDTC = Long-term debt to total capitalization ratio.

Source: Value Line, Augusf 30,1996.
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